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Abstract Many artificial life researchers stress the
interdisciplinary character of the field. Against such a
backdrop, this report reviews and discusses artificial life, as it
is depicted in, and as it interfaces with, adjacent disciplines
(in particular, philosophy, biology, and linguistics), and in the
light of a specific historical example of interdisciplinary
research (namely cybernetics) with which artificial life shares
many features. This report grew out of a workshop held at
the Sixth European Conference on Artificial Life in Prague
and features individual contributions from the workshop’s
eight speakers, plus a section designed to reflect the debates
that took place during the workshop’s discussion sessions.
The major theme that emerged during these sessions was the
identity and status of artificial life as a scientific endeavor.
1 Introduction
This report is the outcome of a workshop held on September 9, 2001, at the University
of Economics, Prague, Czech Republic, as part of the Sixth European Conference on
Artificial Life. Entitled The View From Elsewhere: Perspectives on ALife Modeling, the
event was organized by four of the present authors (Bullock, Di Paolo, Noble, and
Wheeler). Its aim was to review and discuss artificial life (ALife) as it is depicted in,
and as it interfaces with, adjacent disciplines. If, as many ALifers hope, ALife is to
interface successfully with biology, philosophy, linguistics, economics, and other fields
of scientific enquiry, it is important to consider the opinions and attitudes of practitioners
from these disciplines. What can we learn from their conceptions and misconceptions?
What lessons are there to be learned from ALife research of a genuinely interdisciplinary
character, and from the history of interdisciplinary research into adaptive systems? How
can we improve the ability of ALife to “cross over”?
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The workshop was divided into five hour-long sessions. Each of the first three ses-
sions addressed a different ALife-related interdisciplinary interface. In the context of
the issues targeted by the workshop, the various speakers either (a) examined bodies of
research (often their own) located at the specific interdisciplinary interface in question,
or (b) presented critical reactions to writings on ALife authored by researchers who are
interested in ALife but who work primarily in the targeted adjacent discipline, or (c)
both. The interfaces chosen for investigation were those with philosophy, biology, and
linguistics. The fourth session of the workshop shifted the focus somewhat, in that it
concentrated on a particular historical experience of cross-disciplinary understanding
and misunderstanding, one which is close to the hearts of many ALifers, namely, cy-
bernetics. The first four sessions allowed plenty of time for constructive discussion and
debate, but to ensure that there was a proper opportunity for participants to investigate
the issues collectively, the fifth and final session was reserved for open discussion.
The main body of this report is organized as follows: Each of the four main speak-
ers at the workshop (Bedau, Bullock, Noble, and Husbands) and each of the four
discussants (Wheeler, Seth, Kirby, and Di Paolo) has contributed a summary of what
he considers to have been the main points of his presentation, typically written so as
to take into account aspects of the discussions that followed. Each of these summaries
appears as a distinct subsection of Sections 2–5 inclusive. The title of each of these sub-
sections is the name of the author concerned. These eight contributions are followed
by a “Reactions” section in which certain themes from the various discussions are de-
scribed. It is important to note that this report does not have a single voice, but rather
many voices. Indeed, the word “perspectives” in the title is deliberately ambiguous. It
signals not only the various perspectives on ALife adopted by researchers from other
disciplines, as targeted by the workshop, but also the often differing perspectives on
ALife adopted by the eight authors of this report.
2 The View From Philosophy
2.1 Mark Bedau
I think philosophy and ALife are natural partners. Neither enterprise is monolithic;
each is diverse and continually evolving. Nevertheless, both share an interest in rel-
atively abstract essences over contingent details, and so-called “thought experiments”
figure centrally in both. (Philosophers conduct the experiments in their armchairs while
computer simulations are used in ALife; see [7].) So it is no surprise that combining
expertise from philosophy and ALife enables us to make new progress on a number of
central issues in both fields, such as emergence, adaptationism, evolutionary direction-
ality, and whether ALife simulations can literally be alive (see, for example, [8]). Here
I will focus on another issue—the nature of life—because it figures centrally in Kim
Sterelny’s recent critique of ALife [42, 43, Chap. 15] and it highlights how philosophy
and ALife are connected.
Sterelny [42] is struck by ALife’s resuscitation of “a quaintly old-fashioned project:
defining life” (p. 587). When he asks “why suppose biology needs a definition of
life?” (p. 587), he could just as well ask the same question about philosophy, for
contemporary discussions of life are virtually absent from both disciplines. But I think
Sterelny misconstrues the contemporary interest in life. First, contrary to what Sterelny
suggests, the central concern is not to analyze our concept of life. This concept is
an historical artifact, which varies across different cultures and which changes as our
beliefs and preconceptions evolve. This concept might be an appropriate subject for
anthropologists to study, but not natural scientists or philosophers.
The question about life that interests scientists (and philosophers) concerns the natu-
ral world, not our concepts. Living systems have a variety of hallmarks, such as having
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an enormously complex and adaptive organization at all levels, and being composed
of a chemically unique set of macromolecules. It’s widely recognized that these hall-
marks do not constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for life, but they still raise
an interesting question: Why are these hallmarks characteristically present together in
nature? That is, why do the phenomena underlying life give rise to these hallmarks and
not others? This is a question about how best to understand a fundamental feature of
the natural world. Analyzing our existing concepts will not yield the answer. In fact,
the answer may well require creating new concepts.
The combined efforts of ALife and philosophy are well suited to attack this question.
Philosophy offers the benefit of 2,000 years of experience in examining and clarifying
very abstract hypotheses about the most fundamental aspects of nature (existence,
causation, mind, etc.). One contribution of ALife is to push the boundaries of what
lifelike systems can actually exist. But more important, ALife systems provide one of
the few feasible ways to explore unifying principles that might explain the hallmarks
of life.
It is still an open question whether we will find any such unifying principles or,
indeed, whether any exist. Sterelny doubts whether ALife will shed any light on the
general nature of life. He is surely right that the abstractness of ALife systems makes
it difficult to connect their behavior to the behavior of natural living systems. On the
other hand, how can we clarify and evaluate candidate explanations of life’s hallmarks
without computer simulations? Purely verbal theories often sound plausible before one
tries to make them concrete enough to simulate, and the behavior of complex adaptive
systems is notoriously hard to predict except through extensive simulations.
Computer simulations are foreign to philosophical methodology today, but I think
this will change in the near future. Thought experiments involving complex phenomena
like emergence and the creative potential of evolving systems are too difficult to analyze
from the armchair, but we now are able to study them with computer simulations. This
new methodology enables us to pursue issues that are ignored today, such as the
ultimate nature of life. Some people want to show how ALife work helps answer the
questions currently pursued in other disciplines. I want to make a different point:
Partnership with ALife can enable philosophy (and other disciplines) to pursue new
fruitful research directions. It is always controversial to propose changing the questions
a discipline addresses. Nevertheless, I think we should embrace this controversy, since
the possible fruits are so attractive.
2.2 Michael Wheeler
When philosophers look at ALife, what do they see? Dennett [17] offers two possible
answers:
1. ALife as a philosophical method.
2. ALife as an object for philosophical study.
Dennett sanctions both options but favors the first. I think his positive argument for
the first option is problematic. Here’s why.
Dennett’s [17] argument rests on the claim that ALife models (simulations and robots)
are “prosthetically controlled thought experiments” (p. 291). The idea is that while
ALife models are realized as computers and robots, they retain the status of thought
experiments, in that they are “arguments about what is possible, necessary and impos-
sible under various assumptions” (p. 291; cf. Bedau [7], and in Sect. 2.1 above). The
argument is completed by the claim that thought experiments are a distinctively philo-
sophical tool. Let’s start with that latter claim. It seems straightforwardly false: Thought
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experiments are a recognized tool of science, too (e.g., Galileo’s falling bodies, Ein-
stein’s train). And notice that this gap would not be bridged by the additional point
that ALife gains its philosophical credentials by addressing questions of philosophical
interest. Science and the arts routinely tackle such questions, without thereby turning
into subdisciplines of philosophy.
In any case, ALife models are not thought experiments—philosophical or scientific.
Consider: If one maintains that ALife models are thought experiments because they
provide insights into possible worlds (life as it could be and maybe is), rather than
the actual world, one risks counting many well-known mathematical models from, say,
theoretical biology (e.g., Grafen’s handicap principle models [21]), as thought exper-
iments. And that is to lose a distinction (between mathematical models and thought
experiments) that is worth having. This loss prevails even if one adds in Dennett’s
rider about possibility and necessity, or, in the case of simulations, Di Paolo et al.’s [18]
neo-Kuhnian analysis that ALife models are thought experiments because they work
by provoking a reorganization of our concepts. Here is a way forward: On a no-
nonsense account, a thought experiment is a device that takes place in the imagination
[11]. Unlike other accounts, the no-nonsense account allows us to draw the line in the
right place. Since neither ALife models nor mathematical models are (in the relevant
sense) realized in the imagination, they are not thought experiments. So we end up
with thought experiments on one side of the line, and ALife models and biological
mathematical models on the other.
This suggests a better account of ALife models, or of ALife simulations at least. These
are best conceived as close relations of biological mathematical models (cf. Sterelny’s
conclusion that ALife simulations are representations of biological processes [42]). They
are useful relations: They allow us to drop some of the unrealistic assumptions that
mathematical models often make for reasons of mathematics rather than biology (e.g.,
random mating, infinite populations). But they are relations, nonetheless. That, I think,
is the right thing for philosophers to see.
3 The View From Biology
3.1 Seth Bullock
Could ALife simulation modeling be a lingua franca between theoretical and empirical
biology?
Within the ALife community, computer simulations are being designed and built
such that their ongoing dynamic behavior reflects that of natural processes as they
unfold over time. Through exploring how these simulation models behave, and how
this behavior changes as their parameters, initial conditions, and so forth are varied,
modelers hope to learn more about (our theories of) the natural processes that these
computer simulations were modeled upon. If ALife simulations are to play this kind of
scientific role successfully, if they are to serve as useful scientific models, it is important
that (a) they meet the same methodological standards as models from more orthodox
modeling paradigms and (b) they offer something beyond and possibly above these
existing modeling approaches.
These twin concerns motivate the majority of writing on ALife modeling methodology
[10, 12, 18, 33, 44]. When is ALife simulation appropriate? What are its strengths and
weaknesses? How can ALife simulation models be verified, calibrated, assessed, and
employed to best effect? How realistic should an ALife model be? In what senses
are they superior to formal mathematical models? In what senses are they inferior?
How can we improve their rigor and their ability to interface with existing modeling
traditions?
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In my opinion these debates are necessary and important if ALife simulation mod-
eling is to engage successfully with mainstream science. However, I believe that in
concentrating on issues of methodological rigor and in identifying the benefits of sim-
ulation models with their ability to augment, extend, or challenge existing modeling
paradigms, an important potential role for these models is being neglected.
Over the last few decades, theoretical biologists have made important inroads into
modeling what were often previously pretty informal evolutionary and ecological ideas.
However, these models tend to be couched in terms of formulae, calculus, game theory,
and such. While empirical biologists in the field and laboratory appreciate that these
models are crucially important to ecology and evolutionary biology, many have little
inclination to digest the mathematics. This appears to be leading to an increasing divide
between the theoretical and empirical camps. Field biology, theoretical modeling and
experimentation were once carried out by the same individuals. However, as with most
modern science, it is now the norm to find greater specialization. As has been pointed
out [35], these increases in specialization often take place at the expense of genuine
dialogue between specialists.
Against the backdrop provided by this crude caricature of modern biology, ALife
simulations seem extraordinarily well positioned to provide a modeling vocabulary
capable of supporting genuine communication between theoretical and empirical biol-
ogists. Individual- or agent-based simulation models resemble the process models that
biologists make use of in their informal discussions of animal behavior. As such these
simulation models have an immediacy that their formal cousins lack. When success-
ful, these same simulations also capture the formal relationships that drive theoretical
biological models. To maximize the ability of ALife simulation models to serve the
purposes of the whole biology community, these models must meet the formal criteria
of rigor and so forth demanded of them by the theoretical biology community, but
they must also meet the pedagogical criteria of transparency, clarity, appropriateness,
straightforwardness, and such demanded by the more general biology community. The
ALife methodology debate has tended to focus on the former aspect while downplaying
the latter.
There are few ALife papers introducing ways of better conveying the structure of
a simulation model on paper, or techniques for effectively visualizing the often high-
dimensional data sets that simulations produce. In addition, there is little explicit work
on combating the downside of a simulation model’s immediacy—the tendency of some
audiences to “project” added reality onto a simple simulation, mistakenly understanding
the superficial similarity between simulated agents and real organisms as the point of
a model, for instance.
Both experimental and formal math modeling paradigms have gradually devel-
oped well-understood orthodox presentation methods that effectively encourage clarity,
brevity, and so forth. By contrast, there simply has not been enough time for equiva-
lent practices to arise and fixate within the simulation modeling community. While it is
likely that, given time, an orthodoxy will develop organically, this process can be has-
tened by research into the pedagogy of simulation modeling. In my opinion this work
should be explicitly encouraged if ALife simulation modeling is to fulfill its potential as
a modeling practice that is both completely rigorous and maximally luminous.
3.2 Anil Seth
Can simulation models of an ALife flavor successfully mediate between theoretical and
empirical biology? The recent history of ecological modeling suggests, cautiously, that
they can. For more than a decade ecologists have debated the merits of “individual-
based” models (IBMs), which, as Grimm [22] notes, “treat individuals as unique and
discrete entities which have at least one property : : : that changes during the life cycle”
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(p. 130), over those of more traditional “state-variable” models (SVMs), which utilize
population averages. Early propaganda emphasised that IBMs, like many ALife models,
can accommodate individual and local interactions forever beyond the ken of SVMs and
are critical in accounting for a wealth of empirical data [23]. It was even hoped that
IBMs might thus “unify” ecology, offering up general principles of ecological systems
in place of contingent “rules of thumb” [24].
Ten years later, in a sobering review, Grimm [22] identified a number of difficulties
with this vision, many of which also found voice in the present workshop in the context
of ALife. To give a taste: IBMs are difficult to develop, difficult to communicate (see
Sect. 3.1 above), and difficult to understand. The abundance of free parameters runs the
risk of “WYWIWYG” (what-you-want-is-what-you-get). The flood of data produced by
IBMs is difficult to analyze, and the role of statistics unclear. Perhaps most significant of
all, Grimm argued that IBMs must make greater reference to the concepts of population
ecology inherited from SVMs, such as “stability” and “persistence,” if they are to mediate
theory and experiment successfully.
It is not difficult to see in this history a parallel with the development of ALife, from
an early idealism to recent concerns over methodology and interaction with empirical
data. The concerns of Grimm are therefore to be duly noted, but a question arises: What
conceptual framework should ALife make reference to? Perhaps, rather than accepting
with Grimm a framework as given, ALife models by their flexibility can encourage a
dialectic between alternative theoretical perspectives. Whereas ecological IBMs have
focused almost exclusively on the consequences of individual variation, ALife models
can and regularly do incorporate many other aspects of agent–environment interaction.
For example, by modeling individual rate-maximizing behavior, insights and ideas from
population ecology and optimal foraging theory can encounter each other, and—more
generally—the much criticized gulf between IBMs and optimality modeling can be
reduced [37]. Situated perception and action and/or spatially structured environments
also suggest themselves as means by which ALife models may challenge the utility of
(while continuing to make reference to) theoretical entities derived from “higher” levels
of description (see, for example, [38]).
The optimistic view, then, is that ALife models can not only mediate theory and
experiment, but also encourage theoretical evolution and hence increasingly effective
mediation in the future. What is required: close targeting of ALife models to spe-
cific empirical and conceptual issues, and a healthy appreciation of the many pitfalls
involved.
4 The View From Linguistics
4.1 Jason Noble
What has work in ALife told us about language? If we look at the early proceedings
volumes for the International and European Conferences on ALife, language and com-
munication was a hot topic. There was great enthusiasm for ALife models that were
going to tell us about the selective pressures that lead to simple signaling systems in
animals, and about how language could have developed from one such simple system.
Although there has arguably been some progress on the first of these issues, ALife has
failed to give much insight into the second.
Most ALife work advertized as being relevant to the evolution of language or commu-
nication is really about the evolution of coherent two-way mappings between meanings,
signals, and meanings again. That is, speakers must evolve a mapping between private
meanings and public signals, and hearers must evolve a complementary mapping such
that private meanings can be recovered, more or less reliably, from public signals (see,
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for example, [29, 40]). The fact that under the right circumstances such mappings can
arise has now been safely established.
Have such findings in ALife been picked up on by linguistics? The short answer
is no. An examination of recent “Introduction to Linguistics” courses and textbooks
shows that ALife does not register on the radar. This is not surprising, as the two
fields have different goals. Linguistics is concerned with the empirical investigation of
a well-defined, concrete phenomenon: human language. ALife, on the other hand,
attempts to cast light on the origins of complexity, by modeling such processes as the
origin of life, or the cell, or cognition, or sociality, or indeed language. Whereas the
average linguist might examine many languages for evidence of a proposed universal,
or study the way children acquire language, he or she would be unlikely to speculate
too much about the evolutionary origins of the language faculty. Chomsky’s well-
known reticence on this point has been as influential as his positive contributions to the
discipline [13].
Thus, most linguists have taken the existence of meaning–signal–meaning mappings
as a given, and ALife work showing the evolution of such mappings was never likely
to catch their imagination. Some ALife research has tackled the more difficult question
of syntactic communication—an area that would certainly be more relevant to the
interests of modern linguists—but this work has usually failed to get far. Partly this is
because explaining the evolution of syntax is a very difficult problem. However, as
often happens in ALife, another problem has been that skills in computational modeling
are not combined with adequate knowledge in the application domain. An exception to
this rule is the Language Evolution and Computation (LEC) group, based in Edinburgh.
This group of linguists and computer scientists stands out as doing ALife work that
is likely to be of interest to the mainstream linguistics world, for example, Kirby and
Hurford’s paper on how glossogenetic evolution reduces the theoretical demands on
any hypothesized language acquisition device [27].
The work of the LEC group is often presented at the “Evolution of Language” confer-
ence series. Although these conferences are not exactly mainstream linguistics, there
should definitely be room for more contact between ALife researchers and this com-
munity, as both groups are interested in the adaptive function and origins of language.
There is some risk of the blind leading the blind, in that many of the theories proposed
by evolution-of-language theorists such as Bickerton [9], Dunbar [19], and Deacon [16]
are not specified in enough detail to support good model building. This can be con-
trasted with, for example, behavioral ecology, where theories of the evolution of signal-
ing are well developed enough for a useful simulation to be constructed. It follows that
a practical goal for ALife researchers would be to work with the evolution-of-language
community to devise more specific theories and to explore them in ALife simulations.
4.2 Simon Kirby
Initially it might seem inappropriate to apply ALife techniques to linguistics. After all,
it seems that by its very name ALife is concerned with exploring phenomena that are
intimately related to life. Linguistics, on the other hand, takes as its object of study
the peculiar system of communication that is specific to humans. Nevertheless, an
increasing number of papers are being presented at ALife conferences and appearing
in ALife journals that tackle issues that overlap (at least) with those that linguists are
interested in (e.g., [39]).
Why are ALife techniques appropriate for the linguist? The answer to this question
lies in an understanding of some of the primary concerns of linguistics, and the unusual
complexity of the dynamic systems that underpin language. Fundamentally, modern
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explanatory linguistics is concerned with answering the following two questions:
1. Why is language the way it is and not some other way?
2. How did language arise out of nonlanguage?
We can think of these questions in terms of the set of logically possible communi-
cation systems C . Linguistics is concerned with the set of possible human languages,
LPH ‰ C . The two questions above are essentially about explaining the particular
properties of the shape of LPH and showing how this set came to be from some prior
(unknown) set LPH0 [25]. Before any of this is possible, there is also a nontrivial descrip-
tive task of determining LPH. Thankfully, there is an enormous amount of excellent
descriptive work in the linguistics literature that covers all aspects of language, from
research into the syntax of individual languages—both synchronic [34] and diachronic
[32]—to large-scale cross-linguistic studies that look at the distribution of features of
languages in very large samples [15].
What possible approaches are there to tackling these why and how questions? An
influential perspective has been the synthesis of Chomskyan approaches to explanation
on the one hand, and evolutionary psychology on the other:
1. Why? LPH is determined directly by our biological makeup. In particular, we have
an innate language acquisition device, LAD, that constrains us to learn a
L LAD · LPH [13].
2. How? L LAD is also the set of languages that are functional as communicative
systems for the human species. The LAD, like any other complex functional
biological structure, evolved through a process of natural selection [36].
Already, we can see why ALife techniques might be useful to check the claims of
explanatory linguistics. After all, in its short history, ALife has regularly tackled issues
such as communication, learning, and biological adaptation. However, the case for
ALife as an approach has become stronger in recent years as a number of authors have
suggested that the evolved-learner approach understates the complexity of language
in a fundamental way [6, 26]. In the Chomskyan framework, the key to answering
the why question is the idealization that L LAD · LPH. However, this can only be true
under conditions where the data to the learner are drawn from a single stationary target
language, and all languages in L LAD are equally learnable. The extensive literature on
language development [30], computational models of learning, and sociolinguistics [45]
show this is not the case. This matters because it means there is a new dynamic to
consider in addition to learning and evolution: culture.
We can think of this problem as one involving a cycle of three adaptive systems.
Learning involves the adaptation, within the lifetime of an individual, of internal rep-
resentations to the utterances presented to the child. Languages adapt to the biases
inherent in the learning mechanism over a historical time-scale. The innate specifica-
tion of learning biases adapts on a biological time scale to make the languages that
emerge from the cultural process learnable by children.
To determine whether this tangled hierarchy of adaptation can answer the why and
how questions, linguistics may well need ALife. This is the “weak” ALife position: that
language can be modeled using ALife. Conversely, there is a “strong” position too. It
might eventually prove interesting to consider language itself as alive (a nonobligate
symbiont [14]), and that it could be possible to create a genuine language in silico [41].
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5 The View From History: Cybernetics
5.1 Philip Husbands
From September 1949 to July 1953 a select dining club met regularly to discuss ideas
and issues relating to cybernetics. The Ratio Club, as the group became known after the
second meeting, usually gathered in a room in the National Hospital, London, where,
after a meal and drinks, participants “: : : would turn in their easy chairs towards a
blackboard where someone would open a discussion : : :” (J. Bates, unpublished letter
to Grey Walter, July, 1949). The club was founded and organized by John Bates, a
physiologist at the National Hospital. The other 20 carefully selected members were
a mixed group of mainly young physiologists, engineers, and mathematicians. Only
“those who had Wiener’s ideas before Wiener’s [50] book appeared” (J. Bates, unpub-
lished letter to Grey Walter, July, 1949) qualified for membership. To avoid restricting
open discussion, no one of professorial rank could join and if any members should be
promoted to that level, a club rule stated that they must resign (J. Bates, unpublished
papers and records for the Ratio Club). There are two things that make the club truly
extraordinary from an historical perspective. The first is the fact that many of its mem-
bers went on to become extremely prominent scientists. The second is the important
influence that the club meetings, particularly the earlier ones, had on the development
of the scientific contributions many of that remarkable group would later make.
Space restrictions preclude a full description of the achievements of the whole group.
Instead, very brief outlines of those of a somewhat arbitrarily chosen subset are given
below.
Alan Turing is universally regarded as one of the fathers of both computer science
and artificial intelligence (AI). He also anticipated some of the central ideas and method-
ologies of ALife and Nouvelle AI by half a century—for instance, he proposed artificial
evolutionary approaches to AI in 1950 [46] and published work on reaction-diffusion
models of the chemical origins of biological form in 1952 [47]. Horace Barlow is an
enormously influential neuroscientist, particularly in the field of vision, and was one
of the pioneers of using information-theoretic ideas to understand neural mechanisms
[3–5]. Grey Walter made crucial contributions to the technology of EEG recordings
and to ideas in pattern recognition and of course built his autonomous turtles to study
mechanisms underlying the generation of adaptive behavior [49]. W. Ross Ashby
formulated theoretical frameworks for understanding adaptive behavior that are expe-
riencing something of a renaissance in ALife and modern AI [1, 2]. Along with having
many other achievements in a variety of scientific fields, Thomas Gold was a coauthor
of the steady-state theory of the universe and founded the Cornell Astrophysics depart-
ment. Jack Good became a very prominent statistician making important contributions
in Bayesian methods. Eliot Slater became an influential psychologist, while Albert
Uttley [48] and Donald Mackay [28] were, among many other things, artificial neural
network and machine learning pioneers. D. A. Sholl did classic work on neuron mor-
phologies and P. Merton made very important contributions to single neuron recording
techniques and servo theories of muscular control.
Club meetings were typically informal affairs with one or two presentations followed
by open and lively discussion. Topics ranged from members educating their colleagues
on the latest ideas in, for example, probability theory or information theory, to debates
on the scientific status of telepathy. However, most meetings centered around one of
the research preoccupations of that night’s main speaker. Meetings included Ashby on
statistical machinery; Turing on educating a digital computer; Walter on adaptive be-
havior; Uttley, Mackay, and Barlow on pattern recognition; Turing on morphogenesis;
and Merton on the servo control of muscular movements (J. Bates, unpublished papers
and records for the Ratio Club).
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The Ratio Club was a very fruitful interdisciplinary activity resulting in the highly
productive movement of tools and ideas across traditional discipline boundaries, influ-
encing the subsequent scientific trajectories of many members (H. B. Barlow, personal
communication). A high proportion of the group had previously known each other
at Cambridge University and most had been involved in war-time scientific work that
forced them to think about issues, for example, in gun control or code cracking, that
would not normally have engaged them. This seems to have led to a strong desire to
explore interdisciplinary approaches, as many had begun to see their potential during
this war-time work. However, the vast majority of members still saw themselves as
primarily physiologists or engineers or mathematicians or physicists. With the possible
exception of Ashby, there does not appear to have been any significant will to start
a movement or forge a new academic discipline. Of course, strong arguments can
be made for the view that new disciplines, such as control theory, computer science,
and AI, did later emerge from the kind of work that many members, such as Mackay,
Turing, and Uttley, pursued. But this was not the underlying motivation of the Ratio
Club.
It is worth reflecting today on whether ALife is, or should be, an identifiable dis-
cipline or a loose support structure to encourage interdisciplinary collaborations and
exchanges. We should avoid the unfortunate image some biologists had a few years
ago of ALife researchers: that of a group of meddlers regarding themselves as a crack
team of scientific trouble shooters, armed only with lap-top computers and naı¨ve en-
thusiasm, ready to solve the fundamental problems of biology before moving on to the
next mission. The most fruitful roles, both scientifically and strategically, will mostly
be cross-discipline collaborations and the absorption of tools and methodologies into
existing disciplines where they can be used from a position of authority—just as it was
half a century ago.
5.2 Ezequiel Di Paolo
Whereas those involved in the Ratio Club found little reason to consider themselves
as spearheading the development of a novel discipline, parallel currents in the Amer-
ican scene sought the definition of a new interdisciplinary identity. The cybernetic
movement developed through a series of meetings from 1946 to 1953 bringing together
engineers, mathematicians, neuroscientists, psychologists, and social scientists. Well
known for its contributions to the development of control theory, communication en-
gineering, and operations research, cybernetics was short-lived as a movement, giving
rise to the offspring disciplines of AI and cognitive science (as well as the less con-
spicuous second-order cybernetics). This genealogical relation is well argued for by
Dupuy’s study of the history of ideas leading to the sciences of cognition in the second
half of the 20th century [20].
In the current context, it is interesting to mention the relation of cybernetics to
other relevant disciplines also preoccupied with the study of the brain and the mind.
Cybernetics’ main tenet was that the mind was a manifestation of physics and was
susceptible to being studied by the methods of physics. Against the backdrop of the
logical revolution of the 1930s, the brain was conceived as a logical machine. The key
model embodying these ideas was McCulloch and Pitts’ idealization of neural circuits
in which neurons played the role of digital gates [31]. The idea saw little support from
neurophysiologists and Gestalt psychologists, mainly because its reductive atomism was
not justified empirically. Further developments of the model served only partially to
respond to these criticisms. Cyberneticians were accused of infatuation with their own
creations. The very concept of a model started to reveal the ambiguity in the everyday
use of the word: a model as the imitation of something else, a model as something to
be imitated. Models turned into legitimate objects of study—goals rather than means.
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This ambiguity, and its pitfalls, did not disappear with AI or with ALife. However, it
never caught on so strongly in other disciplines. Models in science are mostly seen as
tools for understanding—they are limited in scope, austere, and pragmatic. It is here
that ALife mostly resembles its ancestors, in the confusion between simulations and
instantiations; and it is here that it must tread most carefully if it is not to repeat the
mistakes of the past.
Nonparallels also must be noticed. Cybernetics contributed key concepts to other
fields, whereas ALife is, for the moment, most likely to contribute innovative methods
such as evolutionary simulation modeling. The technical power behind cybernetics
is dwarfed by today’s computing resources. Cybernetics was the meeting point of
researchers trained in very different disciplines. Although, to a limited extent, this last
point is also true of ALife, the overwhelming majority of ALife practitioners can claim
a background in, or an affiliation with, computer science.
Which model should ALife follow: A flag of convenience as the Ratio Club? A banner
for the fruitful exploration of ideas? Or, as early cybernetics, a discipline meant to do
the job of other disciplines, only with a different, more abstract approach? If the second
alternative is chosen, then we must seriously contemplate its difficulties, and we must
take a close look at cybernetics and its failure at engaging in a productive dialogue
with relevant fields. Collaborations with willing biologists may be the way forward to
resolve these problems, but where does this leave the identity of the discipline? Overall,
the flag of convenience alternative looks more realistic and possibly more productive.
ALife may turn out to be short-lived and badly remembered, but it can aspire to have
provided the space for the development of methods and ideas that, at least during our
time, may have been difficult to develop anywhere else. The job done, the results
should be reaped by other disciplines. As of now, it is not even clear which model
ALife is trying to follow. Clarifying this question is the next logical step.
6 Reactions
Once targeted explicitly by the cybernetics speakers, questions concerning the status
and the future of ALife as a discipline (which in truth had been bubbling away just
under the surface ever since the philosophy session) became the principal focus of the
workshop. During the final, open-discussion session, many participants (perhaps sur-
prisingly) endorsed versions of the view that ALife is not a unified intellectual endeavor
with a well-defined explanatory space all of its own. Rather, ALife is (something like)
a liberating intellectual environment, an academic context within which new or under-
explored techniques and ideas for exploring the phenomena of life can be clarified
and developed. Often, these are techniques and ideas that are marginalized within the
more traditional life-related disciplines such as biology, neuroscience, or AI.
On the basis of this kind of assessment, some participants drew the following, radical
conclusions: (a) ALife enjoys a rather precarious position as a scientific endeavor; (b)
ALife should use the intellectual freedom provided by the field to refine its techniques
and ideas, at which point the appropriate thing to do would be to dissolve into the more
traditional disciplines (biology, neuroscience, AI, linguistics, economics, philosophy,
etc.). It should be noted, however, that this critical rethinking of the place of ALife on
the scientific map was not universally accepted. For example, Bedau, in his presentation
(see Sect. 2.1 above), had already argued that ALife can enable other disciplines to
pursue new research directions. In debate, other dissenters argued that the integrity of
ALife as a discipline flows precisely from, and crucially will be maintained by, the fact
that it has developed, and (one hopes) will continue to develop, new investigative and
explanatory tools that are potentially of use to other disciplines. Yet other participants
argued that the integrity of ALife may be secured by the strong ALife program, which
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claims not merely to study, in distinctive ways, life-related phenomena that are already
within the explanatory remits of other disciplines, but also to create novel phenomena
of life. Of course, one will be tempted by this final position only if one endorses strong
ALife.
Despite these clear differences of opinion, most participants in the debates agreed
that cross-disciplinary interactions, and better still joint initiatives between ALifers and
researchers from adjacent disciplines, are likely to represent the most promising strate-
gies for ALifers to adopt. The discussion undoubtedly fostered an increased sensitivity
to the necessity of cross-disciplinary work, and to the massive opportunities that it
presents, but also to the problems that it faces. In particular, it was noted that such
work is neither easy to launch nor easy to sustain, given the undermining effects of
conceptual misunderstandings, clashes of practice, and unhelpful institutional divisions
between disciplines. Thus the existence of genuinely cross-disciplinary collaboration,
let alone its success, is far from inevitable.
Although the status and the likely future of ALife was the issue that commanded
most of the discussion time, it was certainly not the only matter placed under the
spotlight. For example, the question of whether or not it is correct and/or useful to
interpret ALife models as thought experiments was pursued in the discussion period
of the philosophy session and clearly remains an open question of some importance
to the community. Similarly, Bullock’s claim that ALife needs well-understood, ortho-
dox presentation methods that encourage clarity and understanding was taken up at
some length in the biology session. Of course, these more specific issues are far from
orthogonal to what we have isolated as the dominant theme. Space prevents us from
mentioning a number of other such questions that were explored.
We believe that the View From Elsewhere workshop was a notable success in provid-
ing a platform and some direction for important debates that will no doubt be continued
in new forms and new contexts at future ALife conferences. We hope that this report
is not only a faithful record of many of the ideas that were expressed in Prague on
September 9, 2001, but also a point of departure for those future deliberations and
disputes. Next stop: ALife VIII.
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